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Platonism vs. Nominalism in 
Contemporary Musical Ontology 
ANDREW KANIA* 
I. Introduction 
Ontological theories of musical works fall into two broad classes, according 
to whether or not they take musical works to be abstract objects of some 
sort. I shall use the terms 'Platonism' and 'nominalism' to refer to these two 
kinds of theory.1 In this chapter I first outline contemporary Platonism 
about musical works-the theory that musical works are abstract objects. 
I then consider reasons to be suspicious of such a view, motivating a 
consideration of nominalist theories of musical works. I argue for two 
conclusions: first, that there are no compelling reasons to be a nominalist 
about musical works in particular, i.e. that nominalism about musical works 
rests on arguments for thoroughgoing nominalism; and, second, that if 
Platonism fails, fictionalism about musical works is to be preferred 
to other nominalist ontologies of musical works. If you think in terms 
of realism vs. anti-realism about musical works, then one way of putting 
this is to say that realism about musical works stands or falls with Platonism 
about musical works.2 That's because, for methodological reasons I discuss 
below, a theory according to which musical works are concrete objects of 
some sort is not a realist theory of musical works, properly understood. This 
* Thanks to Curtis Brown and Christy Mag Uidhir for helpful discussion of the issues addressed in 
this chapter, and to Trinity University for financial support. 
1 Nominalists about musical works may be Platonim about cc.her entities, such as numbers (and, in 
principle, vice versa). When I discuss a view according to which there are no abstract entities at all, I call 
it 'thoroughgoing norninalism'. 
• Thanks to Christy Mag Uidhir for bringing this perspective to my attention. 
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chapter is thus a contribution to the debate over the fundamental ontology 
of works of Western classical music, broadly construed, though its conclu­
sions could be applied to other musical (or artistic or cultural) practices 
that are sufficiently similar, if such there be.3 
II. Contemporary Platonism about Musical Works 
The basic questions in the fundamental ontology of musical works are the 
same as those of any topic in ontology: (1) 'Are there any?' And (2) 'If so, what 
kinds of things are they?' These questions cannot be approached separately for 
musical works any more than they can for numbers, ordinary objects, persons, 
possible worlds, and so on. On the one hand, the nature of the thing in 
question may provide strong reasons for thinking there are not any such 
things. For instance, one might argue that the concept of a soul is essentially 
incoherent, and thus that there can be no souls. On the other hand, one might 
take there to be such compelling reasons for thinking a particular kind of thing 
exists that one posits it despite its odd nature, or the problems it creates in 
other areas of inquiry. For instance, one might argue that numbers (conceived 
of as abstracta) are indispensible to our best theories of the world, and thus that 
they must exist, even though it is difficult to understand how there could be 
such things, or how we could know anything about them. 
A couple of basic features of musical works might lead one to think that 
their ontology would be no different from that of something like properties: 
(i) musical works are 'multiple' or 'repeatable'; they have 'instances' (per­
formances), none of which can intuitively be identified with the work. Yet 
(ii) we have 'access' to or come into 'contact' with the work 'through' or 
'in' any one of these instances. In fact, as I have argued elsewhere, the early 
history of musical ontology can be read as a kind of applied debate over the 
problem of universals (Kania 2008a, pp. 426-7).4 More recently, Julian 
> For the distinction between 'fundamental' and 'higher-order· musical oncology. see Kania 2008b. 
There is some debate over how broadly we should construe 'Western classical music' if our aim is to 
include musical practices cencered around the perfom1ance of works. (Lydia Goehr 2007, especially chs 
7--9) is well known for arguing for a narrow construal. For a defense of the more traditional broader 
construal, see S. Davies 2001, pp. 86-<) 1. I will not enter that debate here. 
• I have primarily in mind here the work of Nelson Goodman (1976 (first published 1968)); Kiehm! 
WoUheim (1980 (first published 1968)); and Nicholas Woltcrstorff(1980). 
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Dodd (2007) has argued, pretty much exclusively on the basis of these two 
features, that musical works are eternal, unstructured, unchanging, modally 
inflexible, abstract types. s 
But musical works have further, equally basic, features that do not allow 
their ontology (or debates about it) to be assimilated to that of properties 
so easily. For instance, (iii) musical works are intentionally created by 
composers; (iv) they are normative, both in the sense that they specify 
how their performances should go, and in the sense that they admit of 
better and worse performances; and (v) they possess aesthetic or artistic 
properties that seem to depend on the cultural context of their composition. 
To hold that these latter features, and others like them, are relevant to the 
ontology of music is to subscribe to a methodological principle held by 
many ontologists of art over the last thirty years, a principle now widely 
known, thanks to the work of David Davies, as 'the pragmatic constraint' 
(2004, p. 18). The principle is so-called not because of any connection with 
the philosophical theories of Pierce, James, and Dewey, but because it takes 
artistic practices to be the yardstick against which ontologies of art should be 
measured. As Davies puts it: 
Artworks must be entities that can bear the sorts of properties rightly ascribed 
to what are termed 'works' in our reflective critical and appreciative practice; that 
are individuated in the way such 'works' are or would be individuated, and that 
have the modal properties that are reasonably ascribed to 'works', in that practice. 
(2004, p. 18) 
The basic rationale of the principle is simple, and familiar from other areas 
of metaphysics: we ought to believe that those things exist which are 
required by our best theories of how things are. When we ask ontological 
questions about numbers we rightly take our best mathematical theories to 
be our most important evidence base; when we ask ontological questions 
about music, we rightly take our best musical theories to be our most 
important evidence base. It is worth noting that 'musical theories' here 
does not just mean music theory, narrowly construed, or even musicology 
in a traditional sense. It is, rather, our best understanding of this entire 
cultural sphere, of everything that goes on in the production and reception 
• Dodd explicitly acknowledges his debt t0 Wolterscorff(Dodd 2007, p. 100). 
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of music, that is our evidence base for ontological claims about music. This 
is because, to quote Davies once more: 
[O]ur philosophical interest in 'art' and in 'artworks' is grounded precisely in 
[artistic] practice. It is because certain features of that practice puzzle us, or because 
the entities that enter into that practice fascinate us, that we are driven to 
philosophical reflection about art in the first place. To offer an 'ontology of art' 
not subject to the pragmatic constraint would be to change the subject, rather than 
answer the questions that motivate philosophical aesthetics. (2004, p. 21) 
Davies has been criticized for making unjustified exclusions from this 
evidence base. I, for one, have argued that Davies is led astray by not taking 
seriously enough the ontological implications of our artistic practices, 
including our ontological intuitions (Kania 2008a, pp. 429-32). In Art as 
Performance, his ontological magnum opus, Davies claims that: 
... in reflecting upon our artistic practice in this way, the intuitions that 
are strongest will be those that relate to practical aspects of that practice ... -
judgments made, ways in which entities are treated, etc.-rather than intuitions 
about what works are, ontologically speaking. (2004, p. 22) 
But either I misunderstood Davies or he has taken this criticism to heart, for 
in a recent discussion of the pragmatic constraint, he says that he does not 
'deny that there are ontological dimensions to some aspects of our practice', 
though he notes that 'these judgments, like other features of our artistic 
practice, can constrain ontological theorizing only when subject to rational 
reflection' (2009, p. 163).6 
Robert Stecker has recently argued for a further broadening of the 
evidence base for musical ontology: 
Of course we should look at our musical practices and linguistic usage, ... but that 
should only be a starting point. There are many sciences that study music, including 
musicology, music theory, psychology, and anthropology. Why shouldn't these 
studies generate data that are just as valuable for the philosopher? (2009, p. 383) 
I am sympathetic to this approach in general. For instance, I myself have 
suggested that those interested in a definition of music would do well 
to consider recent work in the psychology of music (Kania 2011a), and 
6 Davies does not comment in this essay on whether this acknowledgement would impact his 
arguments for his own ontology of the arts. 
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philosophers discussing musical understanding frequently make reference 
to the work of music theorists (e.g. Huovinen 20II). But I am not sure how 
much of a departure this implies from current best practices in the ontology of 
art, including musical ontology. On the one hand, it is not clear how some 
of these disciplines (psychology and music theory) could contribute to 
musical ontology in particular.7 On the other, while musicology and an­
thropology seem more promising in this regard, precisely because they aim 
to describe musical practices, it seems to me that (good) musical ontologists 
already appeal to such evidence. After all, when Davies appeals to the ways 
in which people talk about certain artworks (he is concerned with art in 
general, not just music), he appeals to what critics and art historians say. 
Such evidence seems to be the equivalent of musicological and anthropo­
logical data in this context. Similarly, when Theodore Gracyk (1996) argues 
for the work of art in rock music's being the recording, rather than the song 
or live performance, he appeals to rock criticism and musicology. We might 
sometimes hope for better musicology and anthropology-more systematic, 
objective, and wide ranging-but in the meantime we must make do with 
what we have. 
The pragmatic constraint is touted as a methodological principle used 
to arrive at the best ontological theory of artworks. But as such it can also 
be used critically, to reject theories that do not respect the principle. One 
such theory that I have already mentioned is Julian Dodd's ontology of 
musical works. Recall that Dodd argues, on the basis of (i) their repeatability; 
and (ii) the fact that they can be heard in performances, that musical works 
are eternal, unstructured, unchanging, modally inflexible, abstract types 
(Dodd 2007). Dodd thus violates the pragmatic constraint in two related 
ways. Most obviously, he ignores vast tracts of musical practice (e.g. taking 
composition to be work creation and the attribution of aesthetic and artistic 
properties to works) until after he has established his preferred ontological 
theory, at which point he explains away such data, either by rejecting 
it outright (e.g. composition as creation) or by supplying paraphrases of the 
relevant judgements (e.g. as attributing aesthetic properties not to works but 
to performances). The second violation of the pragmatic constraint is 
more subtle, and occurs as Dodd is establishing his view. Dodd argues very 
' Stecker admits that his new suggestion's 'potential for providing better data for an ontology of music 
is as yet unknown· (2009, p. 384). 
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early on that his view is a (in fact the) 'simple' one, the 'default' view, given 
the repeatability of works and their audibility in performances (2007, p. I 
et passim). But judgements of simplicity (to say nothing of default) are always 
relative and contextual. Two prominent aspects of the way in which Dodd 
motivates his view show that its simplicity depends on taking what 
I have called the 'metaphysical constraint' at least as seriously as the 
pragmatic constraint (Kania 2008a, pp. 434-8). According to the metaphysical 
constraint, our ontological theories of art, as far as possible, ought to appeal 
only to entities posited by our best general metaphysical theories.8 The fact 
that in motivating his view Dodd considers only the two features of musical 
works that make them seem most like simple properties is one sign that he 
implicitly endorses the metaphysical constraint. If musical works must belong 
to a well-established ontological category, then one promising approach is to 
ask: Of those things investigated by general metaphysicians, which are most 
like musical works? And 'properties' seems a plausible answer to this question. 
The other, more explicit sign that Dodd subscribes to the metaphysical 
constraint is the way in which he talks about types when he proposes them 
as the best candidate for the ontological category to which musical works 
belong. He claims that upon recognition that musical works are 'generic 
entities', that is, repeatable: 
[wje are ... invited to treat [them] as types because .. . we thereby provide a familiar 
and plausible explanation of the nature of the relation holding between a work and 
its occurrences ... Rather than being a queer relation of embodiment, it tums out to 
be just one more example of the familiar relation that holds, for instance, between­
the word 'table' and its token inscriptions and utterances. (Dodd 2007, p. 11) 
One response to Dodd's approach, then, is simply to reiterate the 'primacy 
of practice', the trumping of the metaphysical constraint by the pragmatic 
constraint. So David Davies argues that '[s)omething that only admitted of 
the sort of appreciation and evaluation permitted by [Dodd's theory] would 
not be a work of art in the sense that interests us as philosophers' (2009, 
p. 163). Here are two more responses. 
• This characterization of the constraint is somewhat rough and ready, in part because those who 
subscribe to it rarely do so explicitly. For an attempt at working out more explicitly the proper 
relationship between the metaphysics of an and general metaphysics, from a perspective sympathetic 
to the metaphysical constraint, see Mag Uidhir (this volume, Introduction). 
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Note that however one formulates the metaphysical constraint it must 
appeal to something like our best general metaphysical theories. One 
problem with this is that it is not clear what our best general metaphysical 
theories are. The fact that contemporary guidebooks to metaphysics still 
take the problem of universals to be a central issue in metaphysics suggests 
that even if contemporary metaphysics is not mere footnotes to Plato, large 
chunks of it might still be considered appendices to Plato and Aristotle.9 
For instance, Dodd takes the existence of abstract types to be relatively 
uncontroversial, while nominalists about musical works tend to start from 
the premise that we ought not appeal to abstracta if we can avoid it at all 
(a point I return to below). •0 
Another problem is with the very idea of a general metaphysical theory, 
as opposed to a specialized theory such as an ontological theory of musical 
works. There are two ways one could conceive of this opposition, 
inclusively and exclusively, but both cause problems for the metaphysical 
constraint. Considered inclusively, our best general metaphysical theory is a 
metaphysical theory of everything, including, for instance, musical works 
(if such there be). But clearly there cannot be a consensus on such a theory 
without a consensus on the ontology of musical works, since the 
latter is part of the former. Considered exclusively, one need not wait 
for a consensus on the ontology of musical �orks before achieving 
consensus concerning the best general metaphysical theory, because the 
latter excludes musical ontology. On this conception our best 'general' 
metaphysical theory is our best basic metaphysical theory-a theory of 
individuals, properties, modality, and causation, say. One problem for 
this conception would clearly be demarcating what is metaphysically basic 
in a non-question-begging way. Another, related problem is the mirror 
image of the problem with the inclusive conception: it is plausible that 
moving on from these 'basics' to more complicated things such as musical 
works could introduce considerations that will lead us to add to or alter the 
ontology required to cover the basics. An interesting application of this 
point can be found in Zoltan Gendler Szab6's introduction to nominalism 
• e.g. Loux and Zinunennan (2003) and Le Poidevin, Simons, McGonigal, and Cameron (2009). For 
the best consideration of Whitehead's famous aphorism that I am aware of. see Lachs (1995). 
'0 Dodd spends five pages early in his book dismissing nom.inalism about musical works, employing 
standard moves in the debate over universals. For responses to these moves, see Caplan and Matheson 
(2006, 2008) and Tillman (2011). 
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(Szabo 2003). Discussing the problem of the causal isolation of abstracta, he 
notes that '[t]his sort of argument is applied all the time across the board 
against all sorts of abstracta, but the fact that it was originally presented in the 
context of the philosophy of mathematics is of utmost importance' (p. 29). 
He goes on to give the example of Jaroslav Hasek's novel The Good Soldier 
Sweik, which is 'presumably an abstract entity, but one that is 
causally dependent on a host of concrete ones' such as its author and the 
Austro-Hungarian monarchy's involvement in the First World War, and 
upon which many other concreta depend, such as Szab6's use of it as an 
example (pp. 29-30). Szab6's point is precisely that if we ignore things more 
complicated than the metaphysical basics, we run the risk of oversimplifying 
our metaphysics. 
What kind of ontological theory of musical works do we end up 
with, then, if we forget the metaphysical constraint and apply the pragmatic 
constraint? We get a non-standard Platonism, that is, a theory according to 
which musical works are abstract objects, but with features not traditionally 
attributed to abstracta. One locus classicus here is Jerrold Levinson's 'What a 
Musical Work ls' (199oa [first published 1980]), though Levinson has 
modified his view over time. 11 Levinson argues that, as features (i) and 
(ii) mentioned above suggest, musical works are abstract objects, something 
like abstract, multiply instamiable structures of sounds. But, as features (iii) 
and (v) suggest, they are not simply sound structures, for two different 
musical works could share a sound structure, and yet differ in their aesthetic 
properties as a consequence of who composed them, and whei;i. One might 
be a simple, naiVe piece, for instance, while the other is simple in the service 
of a kind of primitivism or biting irony. Those sympathetic to Levinson's 
approach have suggested modifications of the view in light of other 
features of musical works. In particular, the normativity and modal flexibil­
ity of musical works have been discussed. The upshot is that the consensus 
among those who subscribe to the pragmatic constraint and reject the 
metaphysical constraint is that the best ontological theory of musical 
works is that they are something like structures of performed sounds made 
11 See, in particular, Levinson ( 1990b, 1996, and this volume Ch. 2.). 
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normative by the production of a score in a particular creative act.12 The details of 
the theory are not important for our purposes. The question is: Are there in 
fact any such things? Thoroughgoing nominalists will think not. I now 
tum to motivations for such a view. 
III. Motivations for N ominalism about 
Musical Works 
David Davies says that '[t)o offer an "ontology of art" not subject to the 
pragmatic constraint would be to change the subject, rather than answer the 
questions that motivate philosophical aesthetics' (2004, p. 21). It's not clear 
why we couldn't extend this principle to other cultural practices, such as 
religion. It seems just as plausible to say that to offer an 'ontology of religion' 
not constrained by rational reflection on what religious practices imply 
about the nature of God or witches, say, would be to change the subject, 
rather than answer the questions that motivate philosophical theology. 
(Davies himself draws an analogy with philosophy of science.) The 
challenge this suggests to the ontologist of art is that though the pragmatic 
constraint will deliver our best concept of a musical work, it will not 
guarantee that anything falls under that concept. 
One response to this challenge is to point out that though the pragmatic 
constraint does not guarantee that anything falls under our concept of a 
musical work, this is no reason to think that the concept is in fact empty. 
Furthermore, the general ontological principle appealed to above-that we 
should believe in the things implied by our best theories--suggests a 
relevant difference between musical works and supernatural entities, namely 
that our best theories of the world (including the cultural world) imply that 
musical works exist, but that those same theories imply that there are no 
witches or gods. One problem with supernatural entities, for instance, 
unlike musical works, is that they (arguably) conflict with scientific theories. 
•• This liceracure is coo extensive co sununarize here, but for a recent example see Matheson and 
Caplan (2008). They consider challenges co Levinsonian views on the basis of che modal Rex.ibilicy of 
musical works, and end up defending the plausibility of something very close co Levinson's own view 
(though they do not endorse the view). 
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Nominalists, however, will claim that there is just such a conftict­
perhaps an even deeper one-between our best concept of musical works 
and our best overall theories of the world: our best concept of musical 
works implies they are abstract objects, and our best theories of the world 
make no reference to abstract objects. The Platonist might try to reply to 
this argument in the same way I suggested she should reply to a proponent 
of the 'metaphysical constraint': she might claim that to exclude the evi­
dence for musical works from the evidence base for our best overall 
ontological theory is to beg the question against the Platonist. But the 
situation is different here. The nominalist is not (or should not be) appealing 
to some pre-existing, settled metaphysical theory. He is arguing that, even 
when we have taken the evidence of musical practice into account, a theory 
without abstracta, and thus without anything like what we take musical 
works to be, is preferable to one that posits abstracta. Presumably whatever 
the details of the argument here, a major component will be an appeal to 
something like Occam's Razor. We would thus have to attempt to weigh 
the ontological savings of rejecting abstracta against the costs in other aspects 
of the theory, such as simplicity. Obviously at this level of generality there is 
nothing I can say that should sway us one way or the other; to go further 
with this debate we would have to turn to particular arguments for 
or against thoroughgoing nominalism. 
It is noteworthy that musical nominalists do not say much to motivate 
their thoroughgoing nominalism. They usually briefly appeal to problems of 
causal interaction with abstracta, particularly the creation of musical works, 
and then move quickly on to considering nominalist proposals. (See, for 
example, Caplan and Matheson 2oo6 and Cameron 2008.) There are several 
responses the Platonist can give to the initial problem of causal interaction or 
creatability. I have already discussed the first in connection with the meta­
physical constraint. Our conception of musical works could just as easily 
(and perhaps less dogmatically) be taken as evidence that some abstracta are 
capable of causal interaction, including creation, as that they cannot be 
abstracta. In other words, the norninalist's dialectic here seems to rely on the 
(bankrupt) metaphysical constraint. Second, there are of course resources 
available to the Platonist for giving a positive account of the nature of 
musical works as abstract and creatable. For instance, Caplan 
and Matheson (2004) suggest some promising strategies for defending a 
conception of musical works as sets or types that are creatable, and Simon 
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Evnine has suggested that creation does not require causal interaction, in the 
case of either concreta or abstracta (2009, pp. 214-15, esp. fu. 25). 
What this suggests is that the norninalist's motivation resides wholly 
in quite general motivations for nominalism which are seldom, if ever, 
engaged with. Perhaps it is too much to expect the nominalist about musical 
works to provide arguments for nominalism in general. However, this does 
mean that the nominalist's case is built on a conditional: if there are no 
abstracta, then musical works must be thus and so. This comes out pretty 
explicitly in Chris Tillman's consideration of various nominalist theories 
of musical works: 'If there is a presumption in favor of the material over 
the abstract, and if the main motivation for musical materialism is that 
materialism is untenable ... , then musical abstractionism is unmotivated' 
(2011, p. 28, emphasis removed).13 The nominalist might reply that the 
Platonist's case is similarly built on a conditional: if there are abstracta, then 
musical works must be thus and so. However, the Platonist has the dialectical 
advantage here, because, thanks to the pragmatic constraint, the 'thus-and-so' 
in the case of the Platonist is how we ordinarily conceive of musical works. 
This means that (a) other things being equal, there's a smaller cost to accepting 
the antecedent of the Platonist's conditional than the nominalist's;14 and (b) it 
gives us some (perhaps slight) reason to think there are abstracta. Nonetheless, 
I doubt these brief reflections will do much to sway anyone already inclined 
to thoroughgoing nominalism. I thus turn now to the ontological options 
open to a thoroughgoing nominalist when it comes to musical works. 
IV. Contemporary Nominalism about Musical Works 
The broad sense in which I am using the term 'nominalism' encompasses a 
variety of ontological theories of musical works. One group of nominalist 
theories is the materialist theories, according to which a musical work is 
some kind of concrete entity, such as a collection of performances or the 
" In the ellipsi s, Tillman refers to the arguments typically marshalled against materialism, which 
he finds wanting. He considers these arguments on pp. 20-8. The details do not affect the point I am 
making here. 
" The 'other things' in this case are elements of the debate between thoroughgoing nominalists and 
Platonists. Of course this debate may well not be equal, but pan of my goal here is just to see how 
ontologies of music relate to more general onrological theories. 
208 ANDREW KANIA 
particular creative action of a composer. Chris Tillman (20II) has recently 
produced a useful menu of some options for the materialist about musical 
works. Call whatever you think the concrete manifestations of musical 
works are (scores, performances, recordings, etc.) the work's atoms. 
According to musical perdurantism, a musical work is the fusion of its 
atoms, and those atoms are its temporal parts. 15 According to musical 
endurantism, a musical work is its atoms, but only one at a time, as it were; 
it is wholly present in each atom, rather than being identified with the 
fusion of its atoms. According to musical spannerism, a musical work 
is coextensive with its atoms, but it is not identical to them, nor are they 
its parts. (As Tillman says, 'spanning is weird' (2ou, p. 19 fu. 27).) 
Another group of nominalist theories is eliminativist theories, according 
to which there are only concrete objects, such as performances and the 
creative actions of composers, and none of these can be identified with 
musical works; therefore there are no musical works. Few have defended 
eliminativism about musical works. Richard Rudner (1950) is the closest we 
have to a classic source, though it is possible to interpret his position as 
materialist. He argues that the best candidate ontological category for 
musical works is that of abstract object, since it does better than any 
other candidate (individual performance, set of performances, composer's 
intention, etc.) at filling the role our musical practices carve out for it. 
However, Rudner considers the peculiarities of the kind of abstractum 
musical works would have to be, and the fact that they would have to be 
created by composers, deal-breakers for Platonism about musical works. As 
a result, he argues, we should stop speaking (at least strictly, as theorists) 
of musical works, and talk instead only of performances, compositional 
intentions, and so on. 
Judging by the title of a recent article in the British Journal of Aesthetics, 
'There Are No Things that are Musical Works', Ross P. Cameron (2008) is 
also an eliminativist, though, like Rudner's, his position is not easy to 
pigeon hole. Cameron argues that we can have our musical works and 
eliminate them too. That is, he thinks that when we ordinarily say things 
like 'there are many musical works', we say something true, even though 
" Ben Caplan and Carl Matheson have defended musical perdurantism at some length (2004, 2006, 
2008), primarily in dialogue with Julian Dodd (2002, 2004, 2007). You could even be forgiven for 
thinking they subscribe to the view. 
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there aren't really any musical works. The reason this isn't a contradiction, 
according to Cameron, is that the truth conditions of ordinary English 
sentences such as 'there are many musical works' do not require that there 
be any things which are musical works. On the other hand, when we 
(truthfully) say things such as 'there aren't really any musical works', 
we are speaking 'Ontologese', the language of metaphysics or fundamental 
reality. The truth conditions of sentences in Ontologese do require there to 
be referents for terms like 'musical work'. I have no space to discuss 
Cameron's view in depth, in part because it is a general ontological position, 
out of which this theory of musical works falls. 16 I do think it is unstable, 
however, and threatens to collapse into Doddian Platonism, eliminativism, 
or fictionalism, depending on which elements of the theory one holds most 
firmly to. 
According to both kinds of nominalist theory I have considered here­
materialism and eliminativism-there are no musical works of the kind 
implied by our musical practices, since those practices imply that musical 
works are abstract. The major difference between the two theories is that 
the materialist sees the denial of the existence of musical works as a greater 
theoretical cost than the eliminativist. Consider that, in some sense, the 
materialist and eliminativist do not (or need not) disagree about the kinds of 
things that exist. 17 They both agree that there are no abstract objects (or, 
at least, no abstract objects that are musical works). They do disagree about 
whether there are any musical works, of course, but that is a disagreement 
about whether musical works can plausibly be identified with some kind of 
concrete entity, not about whether the kind of concrete entity in question 
exists. Moreover, both these kinds of theory count it as a cost to deny the 
existence of the kind of musical work implied by our musical practices. This 
is evident in the case of the materialist by the use of the paraphrase strategy. 
The materialist attempts to show that as many as pos ible of the claims we 
make that at least appear to commit us to the existence of abstract musical 
•• For some initial criticisms, see Stecker (2009, pp. 378-80) and Predelli (2009). 
17 I supply the qualification because any given materialist and eliminativist may of course disagree 
about the kind of things that exist. For insGJnce, one may be a perdurantist and the other an endurantist, 
in which case they would (arguably) disagree about the existence of temporal pans (on some constmal of 
that tenn). But this kind of disagreement is not relevant to the arguments I am currently considering. It is, 
after all, a kind of disagreement two materialists could have. The only relevant disagreements here are 
disagreements between the materialist and eliminativ� t qua materialist and elirninativist. 
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works can be paraphrased into claims that commit us only to concreta. This 
saves us from some kind of error (e.g. the error of failing to refer to anything 
when we attempt to refer to musical works), but attributes some other 
error to us (e.g. not realizing what we are referring to).18 But it is also 
evident in the case of the elirninativist, for the elirninativist does not 
(or need not) deny the existence of the concreta with which the materialist 
identifies musical works. Why, then, does the eliminativist not subscribe to 
materialism? Presumably because the eliminativist thinks that it would 
do less violence to musical practice to deny the existence of musical 
works altogether than to identify them with the concreta the materialist 
believes them to be. After all, eliminativism about musical works would 
make no sense if the elirninativist did not believe both (I) that our concept 
of a musical work is that of a certain kind of thing; and (2) that there are 
no such things. 
It is at this point that we see that the dispute between the materialist and 
the elirninativist is doubly pragmatic: it is pragmatic in the sense that the 
materialist and elirninativist agree about what kinds of things exist, but not 
about whether to call one kind of thing a musical work. Choosing between 
the theories depends on one's purposes. The dispute is also pragmatic in 
the sense that the pragmatic constraint appears to be implicit common 
ground. The question the norninalist faces when choosing between 
materialism and eliminativism is whether it would be better to give up 
talk of musical works altogether or to transform it into talk of, say, fusions 
of performances.19 And the measure of what is better here is dearly closeness 
to, or coherence with, existing musical practices. 
V. Fictionalism about Musical Works 
In this final section I will suggest that a virtually ignored ontological theory 
of musical works-fictionalism-should be preferred by a norninlist over 
18 There may be disagreement among materialists about exactly which errors we are committing and 
saved from. 
•• It is che fact that this would be a transfonnation of musical discourse that leads me co say, as l did in 
the introduction, chat materialism about musical works is not realism about musical works. 
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both materialism and elirninativism by on the kind of pragmatic grounds just 
considered.20 The basic idea of fictionalism is that, given claims in some 
domain that appear to commit us to the existence of things that do not 
in fact exist, we should conclude that these claims are fictional, rather 
than assertoric.21 This is to be contrasted with the elirninativist strategy 
of ceasing to make the given claims, and the materialist strategies of substi­
tuting other claims or reinterpreting the given claims as referring to 
something that does exist.22 
The basic motivation for fictionalism is that a realm of discourse may have 
a value other than truth that justifies its continued use. For example, Hartry 
Field (1980) argues that mathematics enables us to make inferences about 
empirical matters more easily than we could without it. Taken literally, 
argues Field, mathematical statements commit us to the existence of 
numbers (conceived as abstracta), but we need not take them literally to 
get what we want out of them. Thus, we should take them fictionally. Bas 
van Fraassen (1980) is a fictionalist regarding scientific discourse about 
unobservable entities. He thinks the point of such discourse is not truth 
but rather empirical adequacy, that is, roughly, the ability to predict and 
explain the observable. 
These brief sketches are enough to distinguish two kinds of fictionalism: 
hermeneutic (descriptive) and revolutionary (normative). Van Fraassen 
purports to be giving an account of the nature of scientific discourse 
about unobservables, a nature it has possessed since long before his theory 
of it. He is thus a hermeneutic fictionalist-he offers an interpretation of 
what has been going on in the discourse all along. Field, by contrast, argues 
that mathematicians have actually been engaging in their discourse at face 
20 Lydia Goehr is perhaps the best known fictionalist about music works (e.g. 2007, p. 106), though, 
despite the title of the book in which she sets forth that theory, chis aspect of it is noc often commenced 
upon. Also, as I've just mentioned, Cameron's arguments could be given a fictionalist spin, though he 
would clearly rather you just left them alone. 
21 l wiJJ not say much about what it is for a claim to be fictional, to adopt a fictional attitude towards a 
proposition, and so on (likewise for assertion). For an introduction to these topics in connection with 
fictionalism, and the literature on them, see Eklund (2007, Section 2) and Sainsbury (2010). 
" Matti Eklund claims that this makes fictionalism primarily a linguistic rather than an ontological 
theory, albeit one chat is usually motivated by 0111ological concerns (2007, Section 2.1). But the same 
reasoning would suggest that materialism is primarily a linguistic thesis, when it is generally considered an 
ontological theory. On the one hand, I think it would be misleading to think of fictionalism as a 
linguistic thesis in contrast to the other kinds of theories I have been considering here. On the other 
hand, I do chink it is valuable to bring out the interconnection of linguistic and ontological matters, as 
I have tried to do already in comparing materialism and eliminativism. 
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value, saying a lot of things that are false because they are about a realm of 
entities that do not actually exist. He argues that enlightened mathemat­
icians ought to stop asserting such claims, and start making them fictionally 
instead. He is thus a revolutionary fictionalist.23 
What is the relevant discourse in the case of fictionalism about musical 
works? It is musical discourse-precisely the discourse that gives rise 
to questions about the ontology of musical works, and theories that purport 
to answer those questions.24 
What kind of fictionalist should you be about musical works? 
I recommend revolutionary fictionalism. It seems implausible (to me) that 
in ordinary musical discourse people are not committed to the existence of 
musical works as distinct entities, that they are already speaking about them 
fictionally. Application of the pragmatic constraint gives us our best theory 
of the kind of thing people are referring to (or attempting to refer to) in such 
discourse. If you don't think there are any such things, and are tempted by 
fictionalism, then you should think that people ought, when speaking 
strictly, to adopt a fictional attitude towards them; that is, you should be a 
revolutionary fictionalise. 25 
What is the value of musical discourse about works that justifies retaining 
it despite its falsehood? It is the value of those musical practices that are 
enmeshed with that discourse-practices (apparently) involving musical 
works-whatever that value is. This raises a number of issues. The most 
obvious is what the value of musical practices involving works is. I take it 
that a large part of the answer to this question will be a general theory of the 
value of music. I don't have one to hand, but I take it as uncontroversial that 
music is very valuable.26 One might, of course, argue that although music in 
" I am no great fan of these tenns, since it's not clear to me that revolutionary fictionalism is any more 
disturbing to our usual way of thinking about what goes on in a domain of discourse than henneneutic 
fictionalism. But the terms are well established, so I wil  nm with them. Note that materialists can also be 
divided into hemteneutic and revolutionary camps, according to whether they claim the paraphrases 
they provide for ontologically-conunitting claims supply what we act11ally mean by those claims, or what 
we 011glrt to mean by those claims. 
" As the pragmatic constraint suggests, 1 take non-linguistic behaviours to be relevant to our 
interpretation of the discourse. I assume this is uncontroversial. 
2' That said, whether you plump for hermeneutic or revolutionary fictionalism might depend on 
other commitments you have in the philosophy oflanguage. For further distinctions between varieties of 
fictionalism, see Eklund (2007, Section 2). 26 For an introduction to theories of the value of music, see Goldman (2011); Gracyk (2011); and 
S. Davies (2003). 
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general is valuable, musical practices involving the work concept are perni­
cious. One might even think that what is valuable about these practices 
could be retained, and its perniciousness expunged, by reformulating 
the practice (including its discourse) to eliminate the work concept. 
I think this is implausible, but it is not too far from some views that have 
actually been defended in musicology and philosophy of music.27 For 
example, Lydia Goehr concludes that: 
[i]n the end, musicians must just ask themselves whether the most satisfactory form 
of musical criticism is one that is based on the ideal of Werktreue [faithfulness to 
a work]. Ifit is not, they must seek an alternative. No musician is necessarily bound 
to this ideal, however pervasive and persuasive the romantic aesthetic. (2007, 
p. 279) 
She explicitly leaves such questions open, but to do even this is clearly 
far from a ringing endorsement of work-based musical practices. Lee B. 
Brown (20u) also bemoans musical ontologists' obsession with the work 
concept, but he is more concerned that the obsession has led ontologists 
to mischaracterize certain musical traditions, rather than that practices 
involving the work concept are less valuable than they could be. 
On the other hand, it is possible to construct an argument for precisely 
the opposite conclusion: that musical practices involving works are more 
valuable than those without the concept. The basic idea would be that 
the works are enduring entities that thus admit of (i) being worked on over 
time by their creators; and (ii) being appreciated on multiple occasions of 
reception by their audiences. I doubt disagreement over these issues 
will have much effect on musical practices, even in combination with 
fictionalism. It seems unlikely we'll reach a philosophical consensus about 
the values of musical practices such that entire practices will be given up. 
And, when it comes to fictionalism, it is practical matters-the value of 
some discourse other than truth-that count. Anyway, if we did reach 
a consensus about the values of music and this significantly affected 
our musical practices, it would not make sense to bemoan the fact. If we 
27 Ofcourse, if we decided to get rid of the work concept alt0gether, due to its perniciousness, the 
problem of the ontology of musical works would disappear, just as we are no longer concerned with the 
nature of witches. 
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were to discover the true end of music, it  would behoove us to strive to 
achieve it.28 
Finally, there is some disagreement about which musical practices really 
involve the work concept. For instance, I have argued that much jazz is a 
tradition without musical works (Kania 2oub). Goehr argues that the work 
concept entered Western classical musical practice much later than most 
philosophers suppose (Goehr 2007). But, if correct, these theories do not 
affect fictionalism about musical works, which is only about 
musical discourses that do, implicitly or explicitly, refer to musical works. 
We might compare this with van Fraassen's 'constructive empiricism': 
van Fraassen is a fictionalist only about the unobservable entities posited by 
scientific theories; he believes that when it comes to observable entities 
science aims at the truth. 
It is worth noting that the rooting of the musical-works fiction in musical 
practice means that fictionalism about musical works is immune to 
an objection raised against fictionalism about some other things, such as 
possible worlds or moral values. R.M. Sainsbury, for instance, argues that in 
both these latter cases the fictionalist faces a serious problem about how to 
choose the fiction we ought to subscribe to (2010, pp. 190-2, 200-4). This is 
because fictionally subscribing to a possible-worlds story, for instance, 
is supposed to help us discover modal truths-what is really possible or 
necessary.29 But without knowing such things, we will be at a loss to choose 
between different possible-worlds stories (for instance, between a story 
according to which one has at most one counterpart in any possible world 
and a story according to which one has more than one counterpart in some 
possible worlds). Since the value of musical discourse is not epistemic, it 
does not face this objection.30 If we grant that our discourse about musical 
'" This dialectic might be taken even one step further: one might attempt a transcendental argument 
that there must be a diversity of musical valut:s since humanity cannot be wrong in pursuing the diversity 
of musical practices it in fact pursues. But we're now in uncomfortably deep waters. 
" The fictionalist about possible worlds is not (thereby) a fictionalist about modality 10111 co1m, just as 
the ficcionalist about musical works is not (thereby) a fictionalise about music 10111 r<>1tr1. Hence the 
unsuitability of the labels 'modal fictional ism' and 'musical fictionalism', despite their appealing brevity 
(Sainsbury 2010, pp. •?9-80). 
>• I choose fictionalism about possible worlds as my illustrative example because I am not so 
convinced by Sainsbury's arguments against moral fict:ionalism. Sainsbury argues that the moral fiction­
alist is also in a quandary about which story about moral values to choose, that she will end up choosing 
the story that gives the results she antecedently believe in. But he grants that engaging with the moral 
fiction might be useful for non-moral ends such as prudential self-interest. What he seems to reject is that 
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works is (or ought to be) a fiction, and that the practices it is enmeshed in are 
valuable for reasons other than the acquisition of truths, there can be no 
question about the legitimacy of the pragmatic constraint. The story we 
should tell ourselves about musical works is the one implicit in our musical 
practice. 
Why should a contemporary nominalist about musical works prefer 
fictionalism over materialism or eliminativism? As we saw at the end 
of Section IV, what motivates the choice between different nominalist 
theories of musical works is how closely each theory hews to existing 
musical practices. Fictionalism has certain advantages here. It looks, at first 
glance, as if we do not need to alter our musical practices at all. We 
can continue to talk about musical works in just the ways we have always 
talked about them.31 On closer inspection, however, there are a couple of 
changes. First, and most significantly, the fictionalism I have recommended 
is 'revolutionary' in that it recommends moving from a musical-works 
discourse aimed at truth to a musical-works discourse aimed at whatever 
the value is of practices involving such discourse. So though the practice, 
including the discourse, may look the same on the surface, it will be 
operating in a different way. What would in the past have been assertions 
about musical works, for instance, ought really, according to the fictionalist, 
to be put forward as make-believe. Second, as we have just seen, it is 
conceivable that the fictionalist with a complete theory would recommend 
that some practices be changed, in light of the value of musical 
practices involving discourse about works. But this is not a consequence 
of fictionalism in particular, since the change is due to the theory of musical 
value, not the fictionalism. A Platonist about musical works with a theory 
about the value of practices involving musical-works discourse could just as 
easily suggest that certain musical practices ought to be changed. 
It seems to me that the best response the materialist can give to this line of 
reasoning is to press on the fact that, according to fictionalism, there are no 
there will be any way for us (practically? psychologically? theoretically?) to neutrally evaluate moral 
fictions for how well they achieve that end. That seems an unjustified assumption. To my mind, the 
bigger problem for the moral fictionalise is how to avoid the charge that the end substituted for moral 
value (e.g. prudential self-interest) is not being appealed to as exactly the kind of entity the moral 
fictionalist was motivated by rejecting in the first place (i.e. an objective value). 
" I pass over the distinction between the messiness of actual musical practice and the cleaner theory 
we achieve by a process of aiming at reflective equilibrium. 
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musical works. The appearance of congruity with our discourse about 
musical works is merely a fa�ade, since we take that discourse to be about 
musical works. The fictionalist's response to this is to press on the idea that the 
value of our musical-works discourse is not truth, but instead whatever 
the value is of the broader musical practice that includes that discourse.32 
I am not sure what response the eliminativist can plausibly give to the 
fictionalist. In a sense, fictionalism is just an eliminativism that preserves our 
discourse about musical works (albeit in fictional rather than assertoric 
mode). Perhaps the eliminativist could similarly press on the idea that the 
point of our musical discourse is truth, and thus that (given nominalism) 
eliminativism is the only theory that faces up to the harsh truth that there are 
no musical works as conceived of in our practices. But to my mind this just 
throws into sharper relief the fact that our musical discourse would be 
valuable even if there were no musical works of the kind it implies. 
A useful thought experiment available to fictionalists in this connection is 
that of the Oracle of Philosophy. Suppose you humbly submit to the Oracle 
the question of whether musical works exist, and the Oracle succinctly 
answers in the negative. Would you really conclude that we (for any 'we') 
should give up talking about musical works? If you 're a nominalist inclined 
to answer 'no' to this question, you should be inclined to fictionalism about 
musical works.33 
There is something a bit strange about this way of comparing 
the nominalist alternatives. For it seems as though our musical practices, 
including our discourse, wouldn't really change under any of these revisionary 
theories. The ontological theory of musical works as abstract objects is already 
the theoretical philosophical result of a process of reflective equilibrium­
an abstraction, if you will. If the pragmatic constraint is correct, then, as 
philosophers we ought to think of musical works, if there are any, as a certain 
kind of abstractum. Similarly, if it turns out there are no such things, it is only 
as philosophers that we must choose between the nominalist alternatives. But 
that's just the nature of the ontological game. We are trying to figure out 
what ultimately exists, and what we ought ultimately to say about what exists. 
If my evaluation of the various nominalist alternatives here is correct, then, 
» The fictionalist must also have some theory of empty names, which will allow them to explain how 
the discourse can still be about musical works in some sense, just as we can talk about Zeus or Sherlock 
Holmes. But everyone needs a theory of empty names. 
" The Oracle makes its first appearance in the fictionalism literature in Burgess and Rosen (1997, p. J). 
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ultimately, if there are no abstracta of the sort we seem committed to in our 
musical discourse about works, we ought to be fictionalises about musical 
works. For all I've said here, however, the nominalist still faces the challenge 
of showing that there are no such abstracta. 
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